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Summary bullet points 
Thucydides (c.460-404 BCE) wrote an account of the Peloponnesian War between 
Athens and Sparta (431-404 BCE). 
He is often seen as the founder of critical historiography, but also as a pioneering 
political theorist, since he claims his account of the past will be useful in understanding 
present and future events. 
Thucydides is currently much in vogue, cited as an authority on global developments 
such as US-China relations and Brexit, as well as factionalism and populism within 
democratic politics. However, he did not offer simple principles of political behaviour, 
based on a timeless and universal human nature, although this is how he is often 
interpreted today. 
Rather, he presented a detailed narrative, including reconstructions of speeches and 
debates, to encourage his readers to reflect on the complex and unpredictable nature of 
events, the limitations of democratic deliberation, and the power of political rhetoric. It 
is a high irony that Thucydides himself is now being deployed as a rhetorical device. 
The more enduring and valid policy lesson to draw from Thucydides is not that human 
nature is a fixed entity through time, from which secure prognostications can be made, 
but that democracies are vulnerable to cognitive biases of various kinds, which can be 
manipulated by adroit rhetoricians. 
 
In recent years, the fifth-century BCE Greek author Thucydides has been perhaps the most 
widely cited classical authority, appearing in a surprisingly wide range of contexts from 
discussions of US-China relations to Brexit. Commentators have noted his presence in the 
Trump White House, cited both by political advisers and military figures, and he has also 
become more prominent in British political discourse. In many cases, however, he appears 
simply as an authoritative name attached to a few quotes; the nature of his work, an account of 
the war between Athens and Sparta known today as the Peloponnesian War (431-404), and the 
long history of its reception and influence, remains concealed. 
Thucydides’ Life and Work 
We know relatively little about Thucydides beyond what he says about himself; the two surviving 
ancient biographies are both much later and of doubtful reliability. He was born around 460 
BCE, into an upper-class Athenian family with substantial property – including gold mines – in 
Thrace. He kept out of politics, but in 424, aged about 36, he was elected as one of the ten 
Athenian strategoi (generals) and despatched to the northern Aegean, doubtless because of his ties 
to the region. This was not a success; he failed to arrive in time to save an allied city from falling 
to the Spartans, and as a result the demos (the citizen body) voted to exile him. He used this 
opportunity to gather material for a detailed account of the war (which he does not call a 
‘history’, a term not yet in common use). He had, he claims, begun writing at its outbreak 
because he recognised the war’s significance; now he was able to gather testimony from both 
sides, treating it all critically. Ancient sources and modern historians disagree about when exactly 
Thucydides died; the work is unfinished, ending in 411, but shows awareness of later events, 
including the end of the war in 404. 
Thucydides was highly regarded as an author in antiquity, but not widely imitated; his style was 
considered too dense and complicated, and his scrupulous neutrality, not hesitating to criticise 
his own city, was disparaged. The work was lost to western Europe in the medieval period, but 
after Byzantine copies were recovered, edited and translated from the fifteenth century onwards, 
it came to be regarded as a foundation of both critical historiography and political thought. As 
Thomas Hobbes, who translated it into English, said, Thucydides was “the most politic 
historiographer that ever writ”. 
Reading Thucydides 
Thucydides’ work is long and forbidding. A full understanding requires a sense of how he 
conceives the totality of events and their interconnections, but it is possible to gain insight into 
key issues – and to make use of the work as a source of ideas and contemporary comparisons – 
by focusing on a more limited number of passages. Certainly this is how Thucydides has often 
been read by those who cite him confidently. Studying specific set-piece episodes sheds 
considerable light on how Thucydides is deployed in contemporary debates. This paper aims to 
survey the most prominent and important episodes. 
Most critical is how Thucydides is read – what kind of author he is assumed to be, and how his 
text is understood. He is traditionally seen as a historian, and often as the model historian – with 
his image changing in line with changing views of the historian’s task. He is presented as the 
master narrator in the eighteenth century, and as the archetypal critical, scientific historian in the 
nineteenth. Historical readings see Thucydides as focusing on the accurate reconstruction of 
events as an end in itself, noting how in his introduction he disparages the fact that most people 
believe any old rubbish about the past and fail to enquire into it critically (1.20-1). In this 
tradition he is read primarily as a reliable source of information about the past, including 
exemplary models (the inspiring Athenian leader Pericles) and analogies (the Peloponnesian War 
as a comparator for the Cold War). This approach tends to downplay the literary elements of 
Thucydides’ work, as potentially undermining the veracity of his reporting. 
However, there is a separate tradition that sees Thucydides as primarily a political theorist, using 
historical data as the basis for deriving general laws of human behaviour. This reading is based 
on Thucydides’ claim for the usefulness of his work for someone who wants to understand 
events that ‘because of the human thing would recur in more or less the same manner in future’ 
(1.22.4). As with many key lines in Thucydides, there are significant issues of translation – ‘the 
human thing’, the most literal reading, is often rendered as ‘human nature’, which gives a 
different impression from ‘ people being the way they are’ – but it is clear that he perceives 
regularities in human affairs, so that studying the past can illuminate the present and future. 
Primed by this idea, plenty of readers have identified parallels in his work with their own times. 
However, there is a further tendency to assume Thucydides is basically a modern political 
theorist before modernity, even though actual normative political principles are difficult if not 
impossible to identify in his work. It seems more plausible to assume that his approach is not 
‘modern’, but still engaged in the project of thinking about politics (in the broadest sense); his 
work opens up complexity and ambiguity, rather than seeking to reduce everything to simple or 
simplistic principles. 
The Origins of Wars 
Over the last decade, arguably the most prominent evocation of Thucydides – certainly in the 
American and Chinese media – has been the so-called ‘Thucydides Trap’, a phrase popularised 
by the Harvard political theorist Graham Allison. This takes Thucydides’ statement about the 
‘truest cause’ of the war, that ‘what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and 
the fear which this caused in Sparta’ (1.23.6), as a general principle that recurs in similar 
situations. Whenever a ‘rising’ power confronts an ‘established’ power, war is more likely than 
not. Allison identifies sixteen historical examples, including the Napoleonic, Crimean and World 
Wars, in which the ‘Trap’ can be identified, but his primary focus is on current relations between 
the United States and China, offering his work as a warning against complacency. As a result, the 
Chinese premier and other top officials have regularly engaged with the idea of the Thucydides 
Trap in order to reject its applicability, while it has become common currency not only in 
debates about Pacific security issues but in other Asian conflicts such as the relationships 
between India and China and Pakistan and India. 
As an account of Thucydides, rather than simply attaching Thucydides’ name to an already 
familiar idea from international relations theory, this is problematic. The original Greek is rather 
more ambiguous and complex. The statement is more literally translated as ‘compelled the 
Spartans to war’, without the same implication of inevitability. Further, while Thucydides offers 
this as his own judgement about the ‘truest but least discussed’ cause of the war, he follows it 
with a detailed account of how war actually broke out, through a sequence of events and 
decisions, by individuals and states all pursuing their own interests. In other words, far from 
offering a single universal principle to explain events, Thucydides offers a complex study of the 
interplay of individual and state decisions, the characters of different peoples, short-term events 
and underlying structures, and chance. 
Thucydides describes debates, at Athens and Sparta, in the run-up to the war, in which claims are 
made about state motivation; for example, the Athenian description of the acquisition of their 
empire: ‘fear was the strongest motive, followed later by honour and then by self-interest as well’ 
(1.75.3). The idea that all states are driven by some combination of these three motives has 
become established as a basic tenet of ‘Realism’ in International Relations theory. Certainly 
Thucydides’ characters claim these are universal motives, but it is not obvious that we should 
take this at face value, since the speakers are seeking to persuade others of their case. In addition 
the subsequent narrative shows that all three motives, fear, honour and self-interest, can be 
understood in very different ways and heavily influenced by emotions, rather than being the clear 
bases for rational calculation that Realism supposedly promotes (and ascribes to Thucydides). 
Democracy Celebrates Itself: the Funeral Oration 
The source of many of the most familiar quotations from Thucydides – ‘the many not the few’; 
‘our constitution is called a democracy’; ‘the whole earth is the tomb of famous men’; ‘happiness 
depends on freedom and freedom on courage’; ‘freedom is the sure possession of those alone 
who have the courage to defend it’ – is the so-called Funeral Oration, delivered by the Athenian 
politician Pericles at the end of the first year of the war (2.35-46). Pericles’ praise of Athens and 
its society has been adopted by modern liberal democracies as a statement of their own values 
(including the ill-fated draft constitution of the European Union of 2003), while his call for 
citizens to fight to defend it has been deployed to justify conscription in the First World War, 
used widely on war memorials (especially in ANZAC contexts, but also on the Bomber 
Command memorial in Green Park) and cited by veterans’ organisations to emphasise their 
contribution. 
It seems unlikely that the speech recorded in Thucydides is a perfect transcript of what Pericles 
actually said. He admitted that it was difficult for him, as for other witnesses, to recall precise 
details of speeches, and so he set down what it was most appropriate for speakers to have said in 
the circumstances, while sticking as closely as possible to what was actually said (1.22.1). The 
exact meaning of this gnomic phrase has troubled generations of historians, to whom it looks 
alarmingly like non-historical invention. It is generally assumed that Thucydides used speeches 
for several purposes at once: characterising the speakers’ views (including ones they might not 
have expressed openly in reality), presenting their character, and summing up a situation and the 
options available to those making a decision. 
In the case of the Funeral Oration, we are offered an image of Athens as an open, liberal 
democracy, and of Pericles as its embodiment. Many readers think Thucydides was an admirer of 
Pericles (as ‘the first man’ who was able to control the irrational demos without them realising), or 
indeed that the whole point of his history was to justify Pericles’ policy, and see this speech as a 
simple heroization. A more critical reading emphasises how far Pericles’ account of Athens is 
rather odd – in his call for citizens to become ‘lovers of the city’, in his dismissal of wives and 
families – and even coercive, a subtle indictment of his imperious style and imperial plans that 
had led Athens into an avoidable war. 
Plague and Civil War 
Pericles, having persuaded the Athenians to reject the Spartan ultimatum and therefore 
precipitated war, pursued a strategy of exhaustion; rather than confronting the invading Spartan 
forces, the Athenians withdrew within their walls and relied on their fleet for supplies and to 
strike at the enemy elsewhere. This was deeply unpopular with citizens who saw their fields being 
ravaged. Whether the plan would have succeeded eventually is one of the key counterfactuals of 
Thucydides’ account, since the concentration of people in the city led to a devastating outbreak 
of plague (the precise nature of which is fiercely disputed) and to the death of Pericles. His 
successors adopted more aggressive strategies, since (Thucydides claims) they lacked his 
authority and so pandered to the whims of the people. 
Thucydides’ depiction of the plague (2.47-54), and the way the Athenians responded to it by 
abandoning social norms and behavioural restraints, is a powerful piece of social analysis. It is 
echoed in his description of the ‘stasis’ (civil breakdown or internal conflict) in the city-state of 
Corcyra (3.70-83), in which the political community collapsed into democratic and oligarchic 
factions, each seeking outside help to defeat the other. In both cases, we are given a sense of the 
fragility of society, its vulnerability to external events (plague, war). The Corcyrean stasis shows 
the process of escalating polarisation, in which factional loyalty trumps communal and even 
family ties, and the collapse of common norms and values, so that ‘moderation’ comes to be 
seen as cowardice and pre-emptive violence against the enemy is simply common sense. It is 
suggested that the passage influenced Hobbes’ depiction of the ‘war of all against all’ in the state 
of nature; it has certainly seemed to some recent commentators to offer a prescient image of 
contemporary political infighting, polarisation and culture war. 
The Mytilenean Debate and Democratic Deliberation 
The Athenian ‘empire’ had originated as a defensive alliance against the Persians, known today as 
the Delian League. Originally, all members contributed ships and men, with Athens having 
greater influence as the largest power. Over time, however, Athens increasingly used the 
League’s ships as its own navy, a process that was accelerated by having other members 
contribute money to support Athenian ships rather than sending their own forces – which also, 
Thucydides notes (1.99) reduced their ability to rebel, as they had outsourced most of their 
military capacity. The outbreak of war appeared to some of these ‘allies’ as an opportunity to 
escape Athenian tyranny, and in 428 BCE the city of Mytilene, the largest city-state on Lesbos, 
revolted. Athenian forces blockaded the city, and a fleet sent by Sparta to support the 
Mytileneans arrived too late. 
The focus of Thucydides’ account of this episode (3.36-49) is the debate in the Athenian 
assembly about the treatment of the defeated Mytileneans. This was the day after the demos had 
voted to massacre the entire male population and sell the women and children into slavery. 
Thucydides presents two speeches, one by Cleon, the populist politician (or ‘demagogue’) who 
became prominent in Athenian politics after the death of Pericles, and one by the otherwise 
unknown Diodotus. The former argues for consistency in decision-making, disparaging the 
rhetoric of those who seek to be cleverer than the ordinary citizens, and for the need to deter 
other potential rebels; the latter argues that milder punishment will be more effective, as 
otherwise rebels will always fight to the death rather than surrendering. It is notable that neither 
speaker offers any arguments grounded in ethics, only pragmatism. The assembly narrowly voted 
to rescind the previous day’s order, and despatched a ship to Mytilene with its new decision; this 
arrived just in time to prevent the massacre. 
In recent years, the Mytilenean Debate has been cited in the context of Brexit, as the key 
example of a democracy changing its mind without the legitimacy of this change of heart being 
called into question. Thucydides appears to be more interested in what the episode reveals about 
Athenian thinking at this stage in the war – the willingness to take ruthless action in defence of 
its empire, the exclusion of ethical considerations from decision-making – and about the 
workings of Athenian democracy. Both Cleon and Diodotus comment on the susceptibility of 
the citizens to emotional reactions and rhetorical manipulation – as a means of presenting 
themselves as honest and trustworthy – with the latter suggesting that it is necessary for well-
meaning politicians to lie to the people for their own good. As readers, we can identify the ways 
in which they seek to manipulate their audience with loaded words and arguments, and are 
encouraged to reflect on how far this account of democracy is true; we are put in the position of 
hearing the persuasive words of clever speakers and having to work out how to resist them. 
The Melian Dialogue and the Pathologies of Power 
By 416, Athens and Sparta had fought themselves to a standstill, and signed a peace treaty. 
Neither side saw this as anything more than a temporary cessation in hostilities, and Athens in 
particular took the opportunity to extend its power elsewhere. It despatched a force to the 
neutral island of Melos and demanded its unconditional surrender. Thucydides (5.84-116) 
presents a dialogue between the Athenian commanders and the Melian leaders, in which the 
latter desperately tried to persuade the former to relent. Eventually the Melians decided that they 
preferred doomed resistance to the loss of their independence; the siege lasted about six months, 
and ended with the predicted slaughter of the male citizens and the enslavement of the women 
and children. 
Even more than the other speeches in his account, it is hard to see the Melian Dialogue as 
anything other than Thucydides’ own invention; he was not present and there were few if any 
surviving witnesses to interrogate later, and it too much resembles the script of a tragic play. The 
question is what function it serves in his narrative, besides its intrinsic drama. Certainly it offers 
an example of Athens’ entirely instrumentalist attitude at this stage in the war, their refusal even 
to consider arguments about ethics, norms or historical obligations, and their blithe dismissal of 
the suggestion that their ruthlessness might have adverse consequences. You’ll set an example 
for others that will be turned against you, say the Melians, and no neutral state will ever trust you. 
That’s fine, the Athenians respond; if we let you live, it looks like weakness, and we’re mainly 
concerned with deterring our subjects from rebellion. The gods are not going to save you – why 
imagine that they’re on your side rather than ours? The Spartans won’t come to rescue you, 
either. Your obsession with honour rather than safety is going to lead you into disaster; you must 
be the only people who imagine that what might happen in future is more certain than what is. 
happening to you now if you don’t surrender. 
For modern scholars who see Thucydides as a political theorist, the Melian Dialogue is the key 
source text for the reconstruction of his ideas. It is conventionally understood as the founding 
statement of ‘Realism’: the world is anarchic (i.e. there are no over-arching international 
institutions or norms to regulate inter-state behaviour), and so the only rational approach is to 
proceed on the basis of calculations of power and advantage. ‘Stand up to your equals, defer to 
your superiors, and be moderate towards your inferiors,’ as the Athenians say at the end. And 
more famously, early in the exchange, ‘questions of justice apply only between equals; otherwise 
the powerful exact what they can and the weak endure what they have to’ (often quoted as ‘the 
strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’). These ideas, interpreted as 
normative political principles, have inspired a whole tradition of thought in International 
Relations, as well as being deployed to characterise situations of power imbalance, such as the 
negotiations between Greece, the EU and the IMF (Yanis Varoufakis, formerly Greek Finance 
Minister, called his book on the crisis And the Weak Suffer What They Must?) – or the negotiations 
between the United Kingdom and the EU. 
But it is important to stress that these are words that Thucydides puts into the mouths of his 
characters, not his own explicit theory of inter-state politics; it is an enormous interpretative leap 
to assume that he agreed with them or saw them as true statements about the world, especially 
given that this was the attitude that subsequently led Athens into disaster. That isn’t to say that 
he agreed with the Melians instead; they appear to be equally delusional and irrational in their 
decision-making. Rather, we can see this as a powerful depiction of the ways that both the 
powerful and the weak think and speak, the equally problematic ways in which they view the 
world, and the dynamics of the relationship between them. Like the agon (contest scene) in the 
Greek tragedies that it somewhat resembles, the Melian Dialogue is intended to make visible the 
competing perspectives and assumptions of its protagonists; it does offer understanding of 
events that are likely to recur in future, as Thucydides had promised, but in the form of 
questions and contestable ideas, not universal laws of history or politics. 
The Sicilian Debate and the Limits of Human Judgement 
For many readers of Thucydides, the culmination of the narrative is the Sicilian Expedition of 
415-13, in which the Athenians – powered by the unchallengeable arrogance depicted in the 
Melian Dialogue – launched an ambitious expedition against the city of Syracuse, that failed 
miserably and brought about their defeat. Thucydides’ account in fact continues for another 
book (albeit an unpolished and rather disjointed one), and the war continued for nearly ten more 
years before Athens finally surrendered, but there is a powerful sense that this was the turning 
point, after which Athens had lost any hope of defeating Sparta but could only lose, sooner or 
later. The depiction of the disastrous expedition (6.63-7.87), and especially the final battle and 
the ignominious retreat, is a powerful piece of historiography, but the more obviously ‘useful’ 
element of this section is Thucydides’ account of the debate in the Athenian assembly over the 
launching of the expedition (6.9-24), setting the cautious and conservative Nicias against the 
flamboyant, ambitious young Alcibiades. 
There are echoes of the Mytilenean Debate in this depiction of democratic discourse and the 
power of rhetoric, but here the stakes are higher: the underlying question is why the Athenians 
came to make such a terrible decision. Thucydides emphasises their ignorance of the country 
they were about to invade and their confident over-estimation of their own strengths, suggesting 
his belief that the plan was doomed. We are offered the opportunity to consider why Nicias’ 
arguments proved insufficiently persuasive to the Athenians, and how Alcibiades’ speech pushed 
the right buttons. In modern terms, we could understand this as a study of different cognitive 
biases: among others, confirmation bias (all information is filtered through the Athenians’ belief 
in their own power and invincibility), groupthink and the bandwagon effect (‘in the face of this 
extreme passion on the part of the majority, anyone who felt otherwise was afraid of seeming 
disloyal if he voted against and therefore held his peace’: 6.24.4), and the Dunning-Kruger effect 
visible both in Alcibiades’ boundless confidence in his own talents and the Athenians’ arrogance. 
Again, the power of Thucydides’ account – while also a source of frustration for those readers 
who want clearer statements of his views – is the way that we experience this debate as 
spectators, being worked upon by the rhetoric of the speakers just as the original audience was, 
rather than cool evaluation and analysis of it. 
The Sicilian Debate and the subsequent expedition are less widely cited in wider debates than 
other passages. The episode was evoked in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq; the historian 
Donald Kagan (associated with the neoconservatives, both directly and through his sons) had 
argued that the Sicilian Expedition could have succeeded with better planning and more luck, a 
claim that was interpreted as a means of dispelling concerns about the wisdom of the Iraq 
enterprise, while opponents of the war argued that it showed the inevitability of its failure. More 
recently, commentators on the Brexit project have claimed to identify parallels, especially in 
confident claims about the inevitability of success and attacks on naysayers as unpatriotic. If so, 
there must be concern about Thucydides’ sardonic comment on the reaction in Athens when 
news of the disaster arrived: ‘When they had taken it in, they turned their anger on the orators 
who had joined in promoting the expedition – as if they had not voted for it themselves…’ 
(8.1.2). 
Conclusion 
Thucydides’ modern reputation is as a hard-headed realist – if not a Realist, then at least 
someone who sees the world as it really is rather than through a filter of optimism or idealism – 
and as someone who truly understands events; “exiled Thucydides knew”, as W.H. Auden 
remarked on the rise of Hitler and the outbreak of the Second World War. This rests both on 
the assumption that human affairs – at least in the spheres of politics and war – are sufficiently 
regular that the past can illuminate the present, and on the power of Thucydides’ text to 
persuade readers to see such parallels. He does not, however, offer laws or principles to be 
applied, but dramatic scenes to be meditated upon – and a caution against any temptation to 
believe that we can fully grasp a situation or predict its outcome. 
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